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The role of the multinational corporation in development has been 
subjected to one of the highest "heat to light" ratios in the literature 
of any familiar to this observer. Much connnent on the subject can only be 
called polemical, emanating, on the one hand, from those who believe that 
any foreign corporate presence in a developing country entails the loss 
of post-colonial virginity and, on the other, from those who view such 
presence as a simple augmentation of the LDCs' capacity for doing what 
it wants to do in a smooth nee-classical context. The remaining literature 
usually occupies intermediate high ground by listing the pros and cons, 
often as not concluding that the net weight of the argument "depends" on 
the particular circumstances of the case. 
It is, of course, an open question whether anyone can do better than 
provide such a listing, i.e. ferret out what is generalizable about this 
important and growing phenomenon, at least with respect to its economic 
impact on the development process. 
2 
There is general agreement--if on little 
else--that the nultinational corporation is relatively new, relatively 
important, and that it has been growing by such leaps and bounds in the post­
war that it seemed at one time to threaten to shortly gobble up virtually 
all the world's GNP. Even if that prospect is no longer threatening, the 
phenomenon clearly cannot be ignored, in terms of its increasingly large 
role not only in the field of foreign investment but also in international 
1 The author wishes to acknowledge the very helpful conunents of Lou Goodman. 
2 I hasten to add that although this conference carries "political consid­
erations" as its sub-title--and although I readily acknowledge the pervasive 
political economy setting within which the subject must be viewed--I find 
myself, perhaps predictably for a "bourgeois economist," unable to incorporate 
these dimensions to my satisfaction. 
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trade. One's perceptions of what it does or does not contribute to 
development, or what it may or may not contribute in the future, are 
thus not in the category of precious points for scholastic debate, but of 
rather major importance for the citizenry of both the rich and the poor 
countries. There are at least two leading actors in the drama, the :MNC 
(multinational corporation) and the LDCG (less developed country government); 
and two supporting actors, the DCG (developed country government) and the 
LOCI (less developed country industrialists). As to the benevolence or 
malevolence of the instrument from the vantage point of these various con­
cerned parties, there is virtually no agreement and as yet therefore no 
general political consensus as to where policies affecting the multinational 
corporation should be heading. 
This paper takes the basic position that the role of the multinational 
corporation in development cannot be assessed independently of time and 
place, but that such assessment must be related to the particular phase of 
a developing country's life cycle, as well as to the type (e.g. size and 
resource endowment) of the LDC in question. Secondly, this paper emphasizes 
the point that the :MNC is not by any means a monolithic organizational 
concept but itself a short-hand for a heterogeneous set of organizational 
forms ranging from wholly-owned subsidiaries, at one extreme, through 
various kinds of joint ventures, to licensing and management contracts, 
on the other. Thus a more helpful, i.e. generalizable, interpretation of 
"it depends," may be, to our mind, one which differentiates among LDCs in 
terms of both historical and typological dimensions and differentiates among 
various possible organizational manifestations of the :MNC. 
While we are quite agnostic on whether it is, in fact, possible to 
treat this phenomenon in a scientific antiseptic fashion we nevertheless 
' 
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feel that one has an obligation to try. Neither resort to caricatures or 
mystiques is particularly helpful in this effort. The MNC did not just 
happen--there are deep-seated reasons for its existence, persistence and 
growth, as well as for the always controversial nature of its report card. 
We must try to understand these reasons not in terms of some isolated,if 
fascinating, phenomenon but in relation to what has been happening in the 
developing world over the past quarter century of attempted transition 
from colonialism to economic maturity. 
The phase a particular LDC finds itself in as well as its size, 
endowment, etc. will, we believe, dictate a differential analysis of the causes, 
the impact, and, most importantly, the particular organizational manifesta­
tion of MNC activity. Put another way, the MNC constitutes a bundle of 
activities including variable proportions of capital, technology, management, 
training, entrepreneurship, and information. The prominence of different 
components calls for different organizational structures and consequences. 
Exploration of these relationahips in a more "disaggregatedrr sense is, we 
believe, likely to be more fruitful than the customary assessment of the 
role of ,rthe" MNC in "the" LDC. 
Section II of the paper briefly sketches in what we conceive to be the 
main contours of the typical LDC transition process and relates it to the 
changing motivation, organizational content, and impact of the MNC in 
an idealized sense. Section III deals with the many real world deviations 
from that idealized historical path and attemps to relate such deviations 
to some of the current controversy surrounding the MNC phenomenon. Tina fi~al 
section presents some modest suggestions concerning the additional light 
this type of analysis may shed on future policy options facing the various 
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concerned parties. 
II The Idealized Role of the :t1NC in an Historical Context 
Kuznets has aptly defined the development problem as one of transition 
between a long epoch of agrarian stagnation and a long epoch of modern 
1 anywhe~e from 30 to 50 years
growth. Such a transition, history tells us, may lasdand is likely 
to be composed of a number of sub-phases during which the development 
characteristics of the society undergo marked change. In the pre-independence 
or colonial epoch developing countries were characterized by the essentially 
enclave nature of their production and trade pattern, i.e. the co-existence 
of an export oriented cash crop sector and a large, relatively stagnant, 
food producing agricultural hinterland. Proceeds from this land-based 
export activity were deployed to finance the consumption needs of the workers 
and entrepreneurs engaged in the enclave, with the rest either reinvested in 
the further expansion of the export-oriented enclave--or reinvested abroad, 
as dictated mainly by the connnercial and political interests of the mother 
country. Once LDC governments had achieved political independence after 
World War II--earlier in Latin America--they almost invariably attempted 
to intervene in order to redirect these traditional colonial pattems of 
production and trade. This redirection is known as the import substitution 
sub-phase of transition in which LDCG's aim at gaining full control of their 
critical raw material export earnings through exchange controls, and at 
reallocating them towards domestic industrial and overhead expansion. It 
usually includes substantial government deficit financing accompanied by 
inflation and increasingly overvalued exchange rates, quantitative import 
restrictions and the rationing of other critical materials" In fact, this 
1 Modern Economic Growth, Rate, Structure and Spread, New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1966. 
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regime may be characterized as still fuelled by traditional land-intensive 
exports, but with both foreign exchange and domestic saving now channeled 
towards the growing industrial sector and a new protected industrial 
entrepreneurial class. In this sub-phase the brute act of saving and of re­
directing the flow of both new foreign and domestic investment is crucial. 
It is in this period also when the fine points of appropriate technology 
choice or even of appropriate output mix choice take a back seat to the 
exploration of the domestic market, while entrepreneurs are given a chance 
of learning-by-doing under the cover of protection, with distorted relative 
prices assuring them of substantial windfall profits. 
Let us now turn to the MNC in the context of such a transition from 
dependent colonial to independent import substitution growth. The old 
colonial flow of investment to the overseas territories represented a type 
of long-term movement of capital, management and entrepreneurship which can 
be viewed as a forerunner of the MNC. 
British foreign lending before 1913, for instance,was primarily 
portfolio rather than direc~ with most of the investment going to the 
relatively more advanced regions like the U.S. or relatively more secure 
places like u. K. rolonies. Regions not fitting either of these categories, 
e.g. Latin America, (with the exception of Argentina) received relatively 
less in toto of which a relatively higher proportion apparently was in 
1
the form of equity. Thus even the form of capital flows differed depending 
on the country of destination and on its overall state of economic and 
entrepreneurial preparedness. In the post-independence post-World War II 
The above information from Brinley Thomas "The Historical Record of 
International Capital Movements to 1913," as published in Capital Movements 
and Economic Development: Proceedings of a Conference held by the International 
Economic Association, ed. by John A. Adler with the assistance of Paul W. 
Kuznets, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1967. 
1 
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era the political control which used to be associated with the colonial 
type of long-run capital movement was, of course, no longer acceptable-­
nor the almost exclusive concentration on raw materials and extractive 
activity which characterized it. Instead, during import substitution 
investment is channeled mainly into the industrial sector of the LDC, 
with the main contribution of the MNC one of adding to industrial savings, 
capital accumulation and management capacity. At this point in time, 
when the market, the role of relative prices, efficiency, etc. have been 
put aside, at least temporarily, in order to ensure as rapid a rate of 
industrial growth as possible, foreign capital and management can provide 
an important assist. This is usually a period when technology choice 
generally consists mainly in the act of turn-key borrowing from the "shelf" 
of advanced country technology. Thus the fact that the MNC is very likely 
to be biased in the same direction has been no cause for special alarm. 
In this period the watchword is getting the job done as quickly as possible-­
with relatively little concern for efficiency--certainly not at international 
prices. 
Pursuing our idealized scenario, the coming of foreign capital, 
either of the portfolio variety or (more likely where risks are high, 
intervention difficult, and domestic managerial capacity low) in the form 
of equity, can thus be expected to play an important role in this phase. 
The rationale for the wholly-owned subsidiary is undoubtedly stronger at 
this particular time in the history of a typical LDC than at any other. If 
the proper conditions can be established attaching to such dimensions as the 
excessive use of domestic loan capital, the provision of training and up­
grading of local management and labor, the avoidance of certain designated 
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areas where domestic managerial and entrepreneurial capacity already exist, 
plus an ex ante agreed-upon time frame for gradual disinvestment or trans­
formation, the contribution of this particular form of MNC presence may 
be viewed as potentially mutually beneficial. It constitutes the 
contemporary manifestation of the long term movement of international 
1
capital and management skills in the "right" direction. Help with what 
the LDC needs most at this stage, i.e. a contribution to the brute act of 
saving, of getting things done, of managing a relatively new type of activity, 
can be provided by the wholly-owned subsidiary in this idealized setting. 
We do not wish to engage here in the protracted and rather sterile 
debate on the merits and demerits of the import substitution sub phase 
itself. Faithful to our historical perspective, we will simply assert that 
we do believe that the infant entrepreneurial/infant industry argument has 
merit at a point in time, and that much of the criticisms along the Little­
Scitovsky-Scott lines 2 is properly directed towards the issues of how much, 
3
how long and what kind of import substitution packages make sense. If the 
regime is sufficiently flexible, and the vested interests which typically 
grow up under it not excessively strong, we would expect, after some time, 
a transition towards a more open and export-oriented subphase of growth to 
be effected. We do know that this is bound to happen sooner or later 
because primary or consumer goods import substitution will run out of steam, 
either because the industrial sector no longer has sufficient markets 
domestically to keep going and/or because the ability of the agricultural and 
1 Needless to add, a logical accompaniment of such factor mobility would be 
access of unskilled labor into the advanced countries. 
2 Little, Scitovsky and Scott, Industry and Trade in Some Developing Countries-­
A Comparative Study, Oxford University Press, 1970. 
3 For a fuller explanation, see the author's "Relative Prices in Planning 
for Economic Development," in International Comparisons of Prices and Output, 
D.J. Daly, ed., NBER, 1972, as well as the discussion with Eckstein, Ruggles 
and Stolper that followed. 
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cash crop export sectors to keep fuelling an often highly inefficient in­
dustrialization process without any help from industrial exports becomes 
ever more questionable. 
It should, of course, be readily admitted that many LDCs try to per­
severe with import substitut ion, moving from the primary ( consumer goods) 
to the secondary (capital goods and raw materials processing) type. But 
this becomes an ever more costly process and can be sustained in the longer 
run only by countries with a reliably favorable natural resources base--and 
even here problems of increasing unemployment and a worsening distribution 
of income may well force a halt at some point. This stDuggle between the 
"necessities" of a changing resource endowment, socio-political pressures 
and the reluctance of the new industrial class and the civil service to give,_ 
up their windfall profits and power is another,very interesting--but separate--
1story. 
If these obstacles are successfully overcome the system is likely to 
move from its land or raw material fuelled import substitution subphase to 
an unskilled labor based export substitution subpha.se. The latter is character-
ized by the capacity of the now more experienced domestic entrepreneurs to 
combine with the country's abundant supply of cReap labor and begin to look 
outward, away from the limited domestic market, and toward expandable ex-
port markets for labor intensive industrial goods. The industrial sector 
can now be expected to begin to help fuel its ow:n further growth on a sus­
tained basis, while the economy's entire production and trade pattern swings 
closer to the lines dictated by resource endowment and efficiency considerations. 
See, for example, Little-Scitovsky-Scott, op. cit.; Fei and Ranis, 
"Development in Open Dualistic Economies," JDS: forthcoming; as well as 
Hirschman, "The Political Economy of Import-=su'bstituting Industrialization 
in Latin America, 11 Vol. 82, February 1968, pp. 1-32. 
1 
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This change in the system's underlying abilities must, of course, be re­
aflected in accommodating changes in the LDCG's policy package, i.e. gradual 
move from direct controls and distorted prices towards indirect controls 
Devaluation, importand more realistic relative factor and commodity prices. 
liberalization, interest rate reform, the dismantling of other licensing 
systems, etc. are all part and parcel of such changes in the policy package 
as we have witnessed in a number--though still small--of developing countries. 
While no endowment or indeed policy changes are likely to be abrupt, 
what we are contemplating here is the gradual shift from forced marcha 
pattern of import substitution to the more flexible ballet-style advance of 
export orientation along comparative advantage lines. Consequently, in this 
more efficiency oriented labor-intensive production and growth phase the 
as 
For at this point in the life cycle of an economy in transition the role of 
appropriate technology and output mixes in penetrating international markets 
idealized role of the MNC may also be viewed subject to important change. 
becomes much more important. One can now conceive of a benign and productive 
of marketscombination between the advantages of the MNC, with its global scan 
onand technology, and the growing domestic expertise based the specificity 
and pecularities of the local resource endowment and institutional factors. 
In this period, the MNC presence in the organizational form of joint ven­
tures seems to make increasing sense. As indigenous entrepreneurial and 
management capacities have by now gradually matured and as,with the diminution 
of windfall profits,the premium on efficiency increases, there is increas-
ing scope for a functional symbiotic association between foreign and domestic 
capital as well as talent.
1 Under generally more competitive conditions 
1 We, in fact, find the percentage of wholly owned multi-national 
projects declining by about 10% between 1939 and 1967 (U.N. Multinational 
Corporations in World Development, p. 156, N.Y. 1973). 
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there is an increasing need for coming up with the right amalgam of imported 
and adaptive technologies and output mixes to ensure the continued outward­
looking expansion of the industrial sector. 
Finally, after a period of sustained export diversification, with in­
dustrial sector labor absorption proceeding at a rate far ahead of population 
(and labor force) growth, the LDC will ultimately approach the end of its 
labor surplus condition and the beginnings of the epoch of mature growth. 
One would now expect joint ventures to increasingly give way to licensing 
and management contracts as the "final" manifestation of the MHC presence 
in the interplay among advanced countries--along with the movement of port­
folio capital in response to international differences in the rate of return. 
We would expect such interactions to be a continuing, flexible feature of 
the international movement of capital, accompanying a global division of 
labor with respect to both final and intermediate products. 
If we accept, even in rough outline,_ this idealized, if undoubtedly 
somewhat naive, two-track picture of the gradual phasing of growth regimes 
within the developing country, along with the gradual pahsing of what con­
stitutes the optimal expression of an MNC presence, the outlines of a changing 
mutually beneficial relationship can be discerned. There is a gradual shift 
of emphasis from the pure generation of saving and getting the management job 
done to one of efficiency and entrepreneurial flexibility; from the simple 
transfer of technology and tastes perfected in different contexts, to the 
search for imaginative indigenous technology and output mixes; from the simple 
capital-intensive add-on to the import substitution enclave,to the labor 
intensive partnership with substantial spill-over effects. 
In all these efforts the additional possibility presented by a foreign 
MNC presence is, of course, just that, i.e. an additional potential advantage 
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if the above idealized script is not entirely discarded. The real world, 
we all know, is likely to be many steps removed from such an ideal. The 
basic suggestion of this paper, therefore, is not to claim that "all is 
for the best in this best of all possible worlds," but to indicate -- by 
contrasting the real world with such an ideal--that much of the pervasive 
misunderstanding on the role of the MNC in development may be related to the 
fact that some or all of the major parties involved too often choose to 
ignore the historical context and thus the changing nature of any potential 
mutually beneficial interdependence between the MNC and the LDC. If, for 
one reason or another, one party or another, attempts--as they do--to move 
against these underlying realities, e.g. to rearrange the sequence, or to 
prevent the sequence from playing itself out, global welfare benefits decline 
a?)d frictions as to their distribution rise. We intend to illustrate this 
point and to pursue the resultant inevitable generation of substantial con­
flicts in the next section. 
III Departures from the Evolutionary Ideal 
If we read the record of the past quarter of a century correctly, there 
exist substantial real world obstacles to any such idealized or "normal" 
phasing of a changing relationship between the LDC and MNC. On the side of 
the MNCs there has been a clear reluctance to move from the wholly-owned 
subsidiary to the joint venture, licensing, etc. as host LDC entrepreneurial 
capacity matures and pure saving assumes a lesser importance. On the part 
of the LDCG's there is often a desire to retain import substitution controls 
long after their rationale has lost its force but, as the MNC mystique de­
clines, large MNC profits are noted, and nationalistic resentments increase, 
to attempt to turn the temperature down only for the foreign investor. This 
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is likely to be due to a mutual misunderstanding of the predictable dynamics 
of the relationship over time. The bargains struck initially during early 
import substitution are almost bound to guarantee the MNC an extremely high 
rate of return, based in substantial part on the public grant of monopoly 
power, which it is later understandably loathe to surrender. The LDC for 
its part, often wants the MNC presence at that point for reasons of prestige, 
bandwagon effects or security, almost regardless of the terms--and often at 
terms much in excess of what it would take to attract it. Witness not only 
the protection and market-power granted through licensing and other controls 
but also the lavish tax holiday and other fiscal favors customarilly bestowed. 
Moreover, regardless of one's judgment about the relative benefits accruing 
to the two parties as a result of a particular foreign investment at this 
point in time, there should be general agreement that the advantages to the 
recipient LDC will decline over time and those to the investing MNC increase 
over time--in the absence of any change in the nature of the contract. 
An example of the reversal of the natural sequence which is sometimes 
attempted is for the MNC to view the joint venture not as a (later) instru­
ment for acconnnodating to the growing local entrepreneurial, management and 
research expertise but to utilize it (earlier) to try to circumvent LDCG 
controls increasingly aimed--in response to growing domestic pressures--at 
foreign capital, as import substitution proceeds. Such tendencies are more 
likely if the product line is fairly broad and diversified, tradanarks 
and patents can be used to gain control over the domestic market:, and there 
is relatively little risk of loss of "real," i.e. appropriable, technology 
via local partners--- or of disagreement with them on transfer pricing or other 
non-competitive practices. Similarly, with respect to the relative importance 
over time of research, de \elopment and engineering, we oftm see an attempt 
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to support research, often very basic, during import substitution within 
both the public and private sectors of the LDC--almost invariably leading 
to a substantial wastage of resources--instead of de-emphasizing such ac­
tivity until much later--and even then, placing more faith in engineering 
improvements emerging at the factory floor and repair sh6p level rather 
than the large b1•eakthroughs of the corporate lab variety. We know that 
the licensing of technical processes is often used by the MNC, e.g. in 
1India, as a device not really to transfer technology among relatively co­
equal partners but to gain certain market-sharing advantages or evade the 
exchange controls and, by the cooperating domestic firm, to be able to enlist 
the help of the foreigners in convincing the "controls bureaucracy" to issue 
certain vital slips of paper. The entire arena of so-called technology 
transfer is thus often misused by both parties--one party claiming that it 
is transferring knowledge when it is, in fact, only utilizing such devices 
to gain or maintain a monopoly or trademark advantage; the other, claiming 
it is receiving knowledge when, in fact, it requires the mystique of the MNC 
hook-up to consolidate its own hold within the import substitution hothouse. 
Thus we encounter certain code words and payments for services other than 
those stipulated, with the main loser the LDC consumer and the development 
objective generally. Patents, licensing and technical collaboration agree­
ments "before their time," i.e. before there can be some reasonable equality 
in the technological partnership and some services for the payments rendered, 
1 V.N. Balasubramanyam, International Transfer of Technology to India, 
New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973. 
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1
have given rise to considerable controversy. 
the 
Even with respect to/transfer of capital, pure and simple, this reversal 
of the idealized sequence is frequently encountered. During import substitution 
when domestic interest rates are usually kept artificially low (part of the 
effort aimed at favoring local industry) it is the MNC which gets favored 
treatment when local capital is rationed. Thus the wholly owned subsidary 
may be more than 50% financed by subsidized local capital with only 25% 
representing new equity flows. During the more competitive, export oriented 
sub-phase, in contrast, when the contribution to brute saving is less crucial, 
higher interest rates within the LDC may induce the MNC to bring in a 
relatively larger share of new investment capital from the outside. 
We may thus observe a marked lack of sensitivity on the part of the 
MNC to the changing capacities and needs of the LDC as it attempts its transi­
tion to modern growth through various historical subphases, and an equal lack 
of sensitivity on the part of the LDC as to how it can really maximize the 
benefits and minimize the costs of this foreign presence at different points 
in its life cycle. In fact, all the actors are likely to be guilty of causing 
major departures from the ideal. There are good underlying reasons for such 
"deviant" behavior. First, the MNC, whose profits are initially based mainly 
on market imperfections, may find itself naturally unwilling to voluntarily 
See Vaitsos, for example ("Patents Revisited: Their Function in Developing 
C01.mtries," Journal of Development Studies, October, 1972) who concluded that 
"in the real world of multiple patent ownership by large corporations, the 
main functions of patents is not to encourage inventive activity but to aid 
profit maximization through minimization of competitive forces." Premature 
patenting is often simply a prelude to the acquisition of local firms. 
Machlup t "Patents," International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. II) 
believes that mainly DCG pressures and mistaken prestige motives account for 
LDC membership in the international patent convention. 
1 
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shift from windfall to earned profits as required by the nature of the phasing. 
Second, the LDCG which often "blows hot and cold" with respect to its reg­
ulatory attitude on foreign enterprise, may refuse to try to differentiate 
among the various organizational manifestations of the MNC in any consistent 
fashion--and end up either welcoming all parts of the MNC bundle or rejecting 
all. (It may thus be obtaining the worst of both worlds, in extension of 
the well-known shibboleth that a consistent, if tough, policy vis-a-vis 
the MNC would be much preferred by foreign investors to one that is better 
"on average" but fluctuating and unpredictable). Third, the private LDCI 
who i.nitially almost unthinkingly welcomes the presence of large foreign 
companies to help him "test the waters" and provide political support for 
government policies favoring the industrial class, often later turns on the 
MNC when he finds himself unable to compete effectively with foreigners who 
have favored access to capital markets, bureaucrats, etc. Fourth, DCG's 
seeking to support the actions of their own investors abroad--which they 
claim are also in the interest of the LDC's--often do so without any perception 
of changes in the landscape and the consequent need for change in the nature 
of the potentially symbiotic relationship• Often the policy approaches that 
of "right or wrong, this is my MNC". Aid is tied to the host country treat­
ment of MNCs in the form of Hickenlooper and Gonzales amendments; and man­
ifestations of modern extra-territoriality extend as far as the application 
of antitrust and Trading with the Enemy Acts to U.S. subsidiaries abroad 
(as in the celebrated recent case of Argentine motor sales to Cuba). 
Little wonder that we sense the current rising tide of dissatisfaction 
and friction.but have thus far had little success in disentangling the meaning 
of "symbiotic coexistence" in this particular sphere of global interdependence. 
Blame is placed by any one of the actors or the other without any real 
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consideration of the meaning and substance of any ideal (or at least "better") 
relationship at any particular point in time, or of what elements of flex­
ibility could be built in as a safeguard for the (inevitable) change in the 
underlving conditions. The all-too-frequent interventions by all parties 
in any such idealized phasing which may be postulated can be placed at the 
doorstep either of a basic misreading of history, or a basic misunderstanding 
of the requirements of long term coexistence, or--if one prefers-- a 
malevolent conspiracy among colluding vested interest groups who, laboring 
under a short time horizon, are endeavoring to "get rich quick" by defraud-
ing the LDC public. While it is always most difficult to determine motivation, 
we shall assume here--for the sake of argument--that the LDCGs taken as a 
whole are well intentioned and desirous of striking the best bargain for 
their societies and that most MNCs are not interested in a hit and run 
strategy but rather in realizing long term profit goals. If they don't 
succeed, it is not because we accept the inevitability of conflict under 
an idealized phasing on both sides, but because there is misunderstanding 
and miscalculation. In order to give this (admittedly vulnerable) argument 
a little more concreteness,let us look at a couple of points of controversy 
to see if they can be related to interventions with what we have called the 
ideal phasing of the relationship. 
The role of the MNC in providing scarce capital is one. Those who 
accept the straight nee-classical line would argue that the MNC is basically 
an example of a long-run capital movement from capital rich to capital poor 
regions and don't understand why there should be any question in terms of 
both global welfare enchancement and benefits to the host LDC. On the other 
hand, we have seen that MNCs often actually don't bring in very much capital, 
i.e. only 25% of the investment is in the form of foreign equity, with 50% 
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or more made up of loans obtained at favored rates in the local money markets. 
In the early import substitution phase,when savings are still the most scarce 
item, a wholly owned subsidiary should, therefore, be asked to bring in 
most of its capital from abroad, either in loan or, more likely, equity form. 
But or..ce the particular domestic shortage which can be alleviated through 
the MNC presence shifts from capital towards ent??epreneurship and information 
(especially in the realm of intermediate goods markets and global technology 
scanning capacity), the LDCG's concern should shift accordingly. 
Second there is the much repeated, and undoubtedly correct, accusation 
that the MNC, especially in its wholly owned subsidiary manifestation, has 
unprecedented power, unchallenged by either the LDCG or DCG, to show its 
profits where it pleases by allocating its overhead, setting transfer prices, 
moving currencies about, etc. On the other hand, many of these so-called 
abuses, serious as they may be, spring from the environment created by the 
LDCG in its desire to avoid foreign competition, and provide special access to 
credit, investment guarantees, tax advantages and "the quiet life" for its 
industrial entrepreneurs generally. Whether or not LDC governments create 
such hot house environments, attract MNCs and then blame them for continuing to 
prosper in the shape of the increasingly disliked subsidiary--even after 
the logic has passed--or whether the MNC influences the LDCG both to adopt 
these policies initially and then to refuse to turn down the temperature 
later may not really be the important question. Undoubtedly some of both 
is correct and the result is the same: an intervention in the capacity for 
a natural transition from import to export substitution on the part of the 
LDCG and in the pattern of transition from a wholly-owned subsidiary to the 
flexible joint venture, licensing and management contract manifestationsmore 
of the MNC. 
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A closer look at the area of technology transfer and technology choice 
may serve to illustrate the point further. Let us differentiate, at the 
outset, between the various components of what normally goes under the name 
of "technology." There is, first of all, existing knowledge about different 
processes or different ways of producing a given commodity in different en­
dowment situations--and ways and means of devising new ones. (This is what 
the economist usually has in mind.) Second, there is existing knowledge 
about different types and qualities of goods--and ways and means of devising 
new ones (this is what the businessman usually has in mind). Finally there 
is the distinction to be drawn between the "actual" transfer of technology-­
of either kind--frorn rich to poor countries, and the "fictitious" transfer, 
e.g. via patents, trademarks and the like, as a device to preserve oligopoly 
power and/or avoid exchange controls. To put it quite bluntly, much of the 
discourse on the role of the MNC in technology transfer has been thoroughly 
confusing because these very different dimensions have not been analyzed 
separately and, most important from the point of view of this paper, report 
cards have been issued on the basis of only a very partial review of the per­
formance and without regard to the historical context. 
Specifically, MNCs are, for example, often taken to task for selling 
overpriced patented "know-how" to their subsidiaries or licensees, the main 
purpose of the transaction being to restrict entry to both domestic or other 
MNC competition, while increasing the domestic demand for "overspecified" 
or luxury goods (soft drinks and toothpaste are frequent examples). There 
undoubtedly is a tendency for MNCs to be less active in this regard when the 
"technology" transferred is less appropriable, e.g. focussed on techniques 
as opposed to quality variation. Yet does that mean that the famous Veblenite 
"advantage of the late-corner" in borrowing from the international shelf of 
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technology is but a fairy tale--possibly commissioned in some corporate 
board room in New York or London? 
We really do not think so; these advantages are real but often eclipsed 
by even larger advantages based on other-than technology characteristics. 
As long as the LDC finds itself in the heavily monopolistic era of import 
substitution growth it will try to transfer "technology" of the Pepsodent 
(or product differentiation) type when what the LDC really needs is capital 
and management. It will try to obtain a thorough-going emulation of the 
international (previously imported) good (e.g. Coca Cola and drip-dry shirts) 
when adaptive goods (e.g. Green Spot and bush shirts) would serve better, 
i.e. prove cheaper while producing the same amount of consumer utility. Later 
on, once a more competitive and export oriented environment obtains, the LDCG 
should realistically welcome the inflow of information and technique and 
product oriented technology change to ensure the successful and sustained 
participation of her industrial sector in world markets. In fact, it often 
does not try to draw this distinction and hardens its attitude--on the basis 
of its now greater entrepreneurial confidence and/or stronger nationalistic 
attitudes--just at the time when it could derive larger benefits. The :MNC, 
for its part, as has been shown by the experience of Japan, will not neces­
sarily "cut and run" when forced to concentrate on "real" technology trans­
fers, but will instead accept lower (earned) levels of profit in place of 
higher (unearned) levels of monopoly rents. But it is also, and quite 
understandably, perfectly willing to continue playing the import substitution 
game, even if now directed, (via export subsidies, tax concessions and the 
like) towards the more favored export markets. One need only remind the 
reader that negative value added can be as negative when contributed in pro­
duction for export (and by foreigne~s) as in import substitution. 
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The product cycle presumes to tell us something about the changing 
motivations of the MNC as it first explores its own domestic DC markets, 
then exports, then moves defensively to produce abroad, and, finally, seeks 
to export from its LDC base. While there exists no necessary synchroniza­
tion between this sequence for any particular product line and the natural 
evolution of the resource endowment, the policy package in any given LDC, 
or the particular organizational manifestation of the MNC, we would expect 
to find relatively more of the wholly-owned subsidiary type of MNC in India 
and relatively-more joint ventures and licensing ~rangements in Taiwan. 
This assumes that the admittedly substantial departures from the evolutionary 
ideal are distributed more or less equitably across countries. In this way 
our view can be subjected to some rough and ready tests not only longitudinally, 
i.e. by eMamining post-war LDCs in transition,or the longer historical ex­
perience of Japan, but also cross-sectionally, i.e. by contrasting contemporary 
LCDs in different phases of development. 
We have not attempted any such tests in the context of this paper-­
which is intend~d only as suggestive of possible new directions of analysis. 
Nevertheless, in addition to the somewhat loose and episodal discussion con­
cerning the contemporary LDCs, a word on the Japanese historical case 
which does not, at first blush, seem to fit the case terribly well, may be 
in order. Japan, it should be emphasized, experienced a relatively unique 
early transition period. On the one hand, it was relatively neglected,even 
after the Seclusion period ended, by foreign colonial powers who were busily 
occupied elsewhere; on the other, the unequal treaty provisions of the Meiji 
period forced Japan into a relatively mild (i.e. low protection)version of 
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the import substitution sub-phase. This meant the virtual absence of the 
colonial type of investment in overheads while in industry proper subsidies and 
extensive technical assistance to domestic investors or direct government 
ownership replace<l the creation of a heavily protected hot-house beckoning 
to foreign as well as domestic enterprise. Nevertheless the wholly-owned 
subsidiary form of foreign investment was used in an era where Japanese 
experience and entrepreneurial capacity was as yet deemed insufficient, e.g., 
in international trade, banking and shipping lIDtil the turn of the century. 
The predominance of foreign firms in these areas was reduced after 1900 when a 
more outward or trade-oriented policy coincided with greater interest on 
the partof foreign companies in joint ventures (then called "joint companies") 
with the increasingly formidable Zaibatsu groups, in such industries as 
electrical engineering, rubber products, metals and linoleum, culminating in 
a substantial expansion during the 20's and 30 1s. As we would expect, technical 
assistance, patent and licensing arrangements became more prominent thereafter. 
Thus the Japanese case may be said to represent a "mild" version of the 
idealized sequence with both the sub-phases of transition and the changes in the 
MNC presence muted by the twin forces of early (and consistent) Japanese 
1 
government resistance and early lack of interest on the part of the Western world. 
The way in which technological change is itself generated is subject 
to a similar and, of course, related cycle. If we distinguish not only between 
R&D (research and development) but add also E (engineering) and I (information), 
we can perhaps arrive at some general statements about what constitutes 
1 see also G. C. Allen and A. G. Donnithorne, Western Enterprise in Far 
Eastern Economic Development: China and Japan (London, 1962), and Edwin P. 
Reubens, "Foreign Capital and Domestic Development in Japan," in S. Kuznets, 
ed., Economic Growth: Brazil, India and Japan, (Duke University Press, 1955), 
pp. 179-228. 
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an ideal sequence in a particular product area. Basic R&D would presumably 
be carried on at the outset in the home labs of the MNC, i.e., during the 
LDCs' import substitution sub-phase, with scarcely any technology-related 
activity taking place abroad. 
l Facing a relatively low volume LDC domestic 
market, the main objective of the MNC would be to gain assured access with 
the help of transplanted turn-key technology, restricted model choice (and 
as little foreign capital input as possible). During this phase MNC sub­
sidiaries very often even carry outright prohibitions against exports to 
reassure rivals on market share stability. Once the host coillltry's infra­
structure and entrepreneurial capacity has progressed to permit a move toward 
substantial industrial export orientation the MNC can be seen to take an 
increasing'interest in the possibility of new product design specifications 
and the use of a more labor intensive technology. As the MNC's profit source 
abroad is forced to shift from production and sale in the home market to 
export sales, expenditures on· R&D and E become important for the first time. 
Conventional corporate lab R & D may, however, still have a much lower value 
than the small modifications in technology and product design which are more 
likely to emanate from the machine shops and assembly lines of the LDC plant. 
The accumulating evidence indicates
2 that most of these consist of labor 
using adaptations peripheral to the machine or core process proper, including 
mainly handling, packaging, storing, etc. But there are also examples of 
machine speed-ups supplemented by greater (manual) quality control and more 
1 Globally, more than 95% of MNC "official" R&D expenditures are made 
at home. 
2 See H. Pack, "Employment and Productivity in Kenyan Manufacturing," 
Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper, February 1974; G. Ranis, "Industrial 
Sector Labor Absorption," Economic Development and Cultural Change, March 
1973; and W. P. Strassman, Technological Change and Economic Development, 
Cornell University Press, 1968. 
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intensive machine maintenance, and the upgrading of a lower quality raw 
material into a standard quality intermediate product (e.g., in cotton yarn 
and plywood production) via the application of ''more labor." In addition, 
the willjngness to sacrifice minute gradations in quality, e.g. yarn counts, 
can often yield large benefits in additional factor substitution potential. 
Such non-spectacular but nevertheless highly important rearrangements of 
the production line (adaptive technology) or non-spectacular adjustments in 
quality (adaptive goods) are the consequence largely of plant engineering 
changes (E) rather than R4D--though "adaptive research" emanating from the 
workshops is just as appropriate a label. Interview-based episodal evidence 
indicates that it often takes considerable time and energy to persuade the 
mother company that such modifications are possible without unintended 
sacrifice of the sacred cow of an internationally advertised product quality. 
At the end of the sequence running from E to adaptive R&D (opposite from 
the DC sequence), i.e. once the LDC is well into its export oriented develop­
ment phase, the case for supporting overseas R&D becomes stronger. Leaving 
aside such arguments as the attraction of lower legal control standards on 
research (e.g. in pharmaceuticals~ we are focussing only on the enhanced 
possibility for a mutually advantageous real content inter-penetration of 
know-how among now relatively more equal partners tied together via a nexus 
of cross-licensing and patents. That this world does not often exist in 
DC-LDC relations--it does within Western Europe, between Europe and the U.S., 
and, to some extent, between the U.S. and Japan--does not alter its in­
creasing realism as we look to the future. 
It is interesting to note that even LDCs still deeply ensconced in their 
import substitution sub-phase (as most are) may open up a selected portion of 
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their industrial sectors to export substitution--via the so-called export 
processing zone device. Here MNCs working with subsidiaries or local 
partners abroad often begin by placing assembly operations abroad in special 
zones out of the reach of LDC tariff and other controls. Raw materials are 
imported from abroad, value added is mainly labor, and the product is re­
exported. This device, along with such provisions as (in the case of the 
U.S.) Sections 806.30 and 807.00 of the Tariff Code, which permit re-entry 
duties to be levied on only the value added abroad, enables the MNC to take 
advantage of the LDC's cheap unskilled labor supplies. The growing phenomenon 
of international subcontracting by process, e.g. in electronics, textiles, 
leather goods, gloves, etc., has been growing by leaps and bounds over the 
past decade. It now constitutes more than 1/6 of total U.S. imports from 
LDCs. But what is even more to the point is that what initially starts as 
a simple process of taking advantage of cheaper labor abroad usually becomes, 
after some time, a source of labor-using technology change. Once the log-jam 
on the preservation of quality standards is broken, additional LDC processing 
levels, forward and backward from the initial emphasis on assembly, are likely 
to be added. One rather convincing demonstration of the contrast of the role 
of E, D, and R (in that order) between a more competitive export-oriented 
and a less competitive domestic-oriented industrial environment is provided 
by comparing technologies in use in the same industry in the same country at 
the same time. To cite but one example, MNC brassiere manufacturers in the 
Mexican border industries produce much more labor intensively than those 
serving the still protected domestic market. Once forced to abandon the 
"quiet life" of windfall profits and satisficing entrepreneurial behavior, 
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MNCs--like their local counterparts--will "scratch around" to find techno­
logical alternatives; they could eventually--e.g. in the Mexican case cited, 
if given permission--"export" competitively into their own domestic market 
and thus reverse the normal Linder sequence of international trade. 1 
The rejection of export processing zones by sane labor supplus LDCs 
and their generally bad press, even where they have been booming along 
successfully, is somewhat puzzling and presents another example of inter­
ventions in our natural sequence, i.e. the beginnings of export orientation 
patterns in a, generally still protectionist system. Surely these are 
enclaves with relatively small technological spill-over effects, but just 
as surely they are not exploiting irreplaceable natural resources, but 
"exploiting" or, rather absorbing, otherwise unemployed and thus forever 
"wasted" human resources. 
As the LDC nears economic maturity, access to information (I) is exposed 
as an increasingly important source of MNC profits other components of MNCas 
superiority fall away. Especially in the particularly imperfect markets for 
intermediate goods and in the global search for appropriate technology the 
common assumption of freely available information is most suspect--even in 
the later more competitive phase of development. Thus a nattll"al evolution 
sees the MNC initially with little interest in transferring technology to 
the LDC, then moving to the encouragement of E, finally R&D--reversing its 
normal behavior in the DC sequence. The joint venture, LDC licensee or 
1 S. Burenstam Linder, An Essay on Trade and Transformation, Uppsala,
1961. 
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independent producer will then become increasingly concerned with I, 
access to information on both technology and design alternatives and markets. 
Imitation or adaptation elsewhere of the Japanese trading company organiza­
tional form--which permits access to an essentially highly imperfect inter-
national market by smaller independent domestic producers, 1 could help assure 
a better distribution of the profits--with due regard to only the legitimate 
functions of effectively utilized patents, licenses, etc. It could also permit 
greater scope for joint ventures between smaller MN Cs and these smaller 
domes.tic firms. Where "real" economies of scale are exaggerated and dwarfed 
by artificial economies of larger size (and market power) such combinations 
are likely to be very effective, especially in penetrating foreign markets. 
IV Policy Options 
Where then does this idealized evolutionary view of the potential for 
productive coexistence-~plus a description of the very substantial real world 
deviations from it--lead us with respect to the future? While one is hesi­
tant to make any predictions, it can be asserted with some confidence that 
the reality is becoming uglier and that LDCs and MNCs currently find them­
selves on something of a collision path as the result of the cumulative 
effects of too many "interventions" by all the parties. There seems to be a 
general tendency towards confrontation in the relations between the rich and 
the poor in areas which matter to the rich (as on critical rew materials) and 
towards not-so-benign neglect where they don't (as on foreign aid). Neo­
colonial fears currently fuelling a new populism in many LDCs are, mo~over, 
I 
1 Now also being attempted in Brazil. 
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interacting with a defensive economic nationalism in a developed world 
perplexed by its own current plethora of seemingly insoluble problems. 
The spiral seems to point downward and could well lead to autarky (and anarchy) 
in international economic relations. 
On the other hand, we also perceive an opportunity in the midst of the 
current upheaval. With so many moorings loose and so many once comfortable 
assumptions under reexamination it is reasonable to believe that this is also 
a good time for a reexamination of the potential developmental role of the 
MNC. This is. likely to be true whether or not our own notions concerning 
the anatomy of an ideal and dynamically changing relationship among the four 
main actors are accepted. Since we are necessarily somewhat partial to what 
has gone before, however, we shall, in this section, attempt to derive some 
conclusions for policy based on our own analysis of the issues. 
First and foremost, we would argue for an unbundling of the MNC into 
its component parts and a much more explicit examination as to just what is 
being transferred and what is being paid for and at what ~ate at each stage 
1of the development process. Most misunderstandings arise because of the 
mystique of the powerful, footloose MNC, bargaining with the poor, option-less 
LDCG, the latter thus being pressured to buy what is essentially a "pig in 
a poke." The capital, technology, management and entrepreneurship components 
of any deal should be spelled out as fully as possible and each component 
priced out. Screening procedures which exist in virtually every LDC, espe­
cially during the import substitution sub-phase, should concentrate more on 
disaggregation and full disclosure, thus permitting comparative shopping and 
1 See also Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro, "North-South Relations: The Economic 
Component," Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 200, April 1974. 
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other than all-or-nothing acceptances or rejections. Fade-out and divestiture 
agreements can similarly be negotiated much more intelligently ab initio in 
the light of some historical perspective which might provide, for example, 
for a transition from the wholly owned subsidiary to the joint venture form 
after 10 years, and possibly further reassessments in the direction of licensing 
or management contracts thereafter. 
We must, of course, contend with the argument that "it is unlikely that 
multi-national firms will ever be willing to repeat the Japanese experience 
elsewhere because, from their point of view, they helped create formidable 
cornpetition to themselves for very meager returns. 111 Cl.early, if offered 
more at every stage they will seek more. But if there is a clea:r and anti­
cipated transition from one function (and one bundle) to another within a 
particular LDC, competitive pressures among the MNCs should assert themselves 
to dictate a willingness to accept reasonable rates of return. In this we 
would be safer in relying on the MNCs' long-ron profit objectives rather than 
2 on some public spirited impulse. Negotiations should recognize that it is 
mutually better to plan on living together under changing rules than to attempt 
to aeny the declining value of some major MNC components over time and thus 
inviting expropriation or other retaliatory action. The burden of proof would 
have to be on the side of those, e.g., Vernon, who claim to see, as indeed 
may sometimes be the case, a general tendency for a broadening and deepening 
relative role for the MNC over time. 
1Larry Krause, "The International Economic System and the Multi-national 
Corporation," Annals of the American Academy of Political And Social Science, 
September 1972, p. 99. 
2
As Heney Ford II put it recently: "A corporation can serve society only 
if it is profitable. And it can stay profitable only if it is responsive to 
the [changing] needs ••.•of the society in which it operates." (material in 
brackets and underlining added) 
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LDCG screening procedures governing MNC presence should thus be modified 
in the direction of greater automaticity, greater predictability and more 
built-in flexibility over time. Such procedures should reflect a recognition 
that some of the excesses of the MNC, ranging from transfer pricing to the 
payment of unduly high wages, to the inappropriateness of the technology 
selected, to the underutilization of patents and the overutilization of 
domestic credit and export prohibition clauses, are not unrelated to the 
policy environment created by the LDCGs for all industry. The MNC can be 
most effectively forced to put its energies into building better mousetraps, 
and using adaptive (labor intensive) technologies in doing so, if it is forced 
to give up the "quiet life" of the satisficing monopolist as the transition 
to a more liberal policy regime is effected. MNCs are quite capable of coming 
up with approp~iate technology and output ideas when there are pressures to 
"scratch around" further, witness the above cited experience in the export 
processing zones and the labor intensive multi-purpose Ford and GM vehicles, 
using simple sheet metal, jigs and fixtures, currently being produced in 
South-East Asia. 1 
Some of the windfall profits created through protection, subsidiza-
tion, etc. are necessary to compensate entrepreneurs for tmdue risks during 
early import substitution. Even "old" MNC subsidiaries have learning and 
institutional problems to overcome. There are advantages, however, even then, 
in working for some harmoni3ation among neighboring LDCs to avoid being played 
off one against the other, on the one hand, and granting concessions far in 
excess of what is required to effect the move, on the other. Moreover, where 
1As a Ford executive put it (William o. Boltt'ke, "Basic Vehicle for South­
East Asia," in Technology and Economics in International Development, AID 
Seminar, May, 1972, p. 75) "simplicity is often harder to achieve than sophis-
,1 tj,.s::~t_io~'-':::_-:-b!:J."t J.t c~_}?~ achieved when the motive is there. The adaptive, ---, 
/'I. :Qabor intensive) case should be distinguished from the so-called complementati~::/ 
programs, i.e. to produce a conventional vehicle by siting different processes 
in different countries, which has been less successfulo 
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the major "advantage" of the MNC is trademark recognition in a low technology 
area, with domestic producers threatened by displacement and domestic con­
sumers by demonstration effects, screening procedures should restrict entry. 
Removal of the veil of secrecy and full disclosure requirements thereafter 
would constitute a giant step in the direction of avoiding unnecessary fric­
tions. Much of the present problem is one of perception and mutual suspicion 
causing secular love/hate rather than arm's length relationships. 
There is much that can and should also·be done by the DCG's individually 
and collectively to facilitate the evolution of a natural and mutually bene­
ficial sequence. Most important perhaps is a sustained effort to move away 
from the image of a knee-jerk DC reaction in favor of its MNC citizens abroad-­
right or wrong. Hickenlooper and Gonzales amendments are viewed as only 
slightly modernized versions of gunboat diplomacy, and are equally ineffective. 
The U.S. has made no major effort in recent years to get rid of these and 
other well encrusted barnacles on the vintage 1961 aid legislation. The 
extension of domestic anti-trust and Trading With the Enemy legislation and 
other forms of extra-territoriality to U.S. MNCs abroad represents, in 
general, an ineffective and highly offensive instrument. Similarly the 
administrative practice of public sector aid tying sets an unfortunate 
example for intra-MNC movements of capital, both adversely affecting the LDC's 
choice of technology. 
Closely related is the issue of OPIC-type government investment guaran­
tees. There would seem to be little reason to provide MNCs quasi-automatically 
with DCG-subsidized specific or extended risk guarantees on the basis of 
financial criteria only. Any MNC investment thus guaranteed by the DCG 
carries with it the implied blessing of the rich country; it is incumbent 
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on the DCG to reassure itself that no unfair trade practices, exclusive 
market demands, export prohibition clauses or other objectionable procedures 
are being contemplated before any guaranty is extended. 
Finally, DCG 's should be ready to support LDC efforts to move out of 
import substitution and into export-oriented growth phases. The most 
important contribution here is by not slamming the door (via higher tariffs, 
quotas and threatened quotas) in the face of the successful LDC's. More "aid" 
spent at home, i.e. in the DC's'domestic markets in the form of effective 
adjustment assistance, would be of great help for any sustained export oriented 
strategy by a substantial number of transitioning LDCs. Moreover, it is 
often substantially easier to overcome both vested interests and honest doubts 
concerning an impending import liberalization within the LDC, if tempor-ary 
aid ballooning is possible to "protect" exchange reserves and public revenues 
during the transition. On the technical assistance side, donors should 
generally view with favor LDCG efforts to beef up their own legal and economic 
staffs in order to deal more effectively--and on a more equal footing--with 
their large and powerful MNC counterparts. International assistance with 
research on adaptive industrial technology (see the analogies to rice and 
wheat research),as well as in providing greater access to markets and informa­
tion to all parties (large and small firms, domestic and MNC' s) on an equitable 
basis, would also be of considerable help. 
Internationally, the intended and actual application of the Paris Con­
vention on Patents certainly needs to be reviewed if wholesale LDC defections 
are to be avoided. Whether a fair conduct code governing MNC-LDCG relations 
along the lines of the recent Kindleberger proposal will do much good at this 
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particular point in time is questionable;1 but it is also clear that unless 
2 
we move in such a direction as a longer term goal, Krause's analogy between 
.the MNC internationally and its domestic counterpart within an expanding 
United States common market will continue to limp rather badly. 
The world thus still finds itself a long way from George Ball's cosmo­
corp or Harry Johnson's uni-globe. In fact, there are some current danger 
signals that, at least in the short term, we may be moving in precisely the 
opposite direction, that of increasingly autarkic warring parties both as 
between the rich and the poor and as between Europe and the U.S. and even as 
between the least developed and the less developed countries. 
Yet, we believe there is reason for hope. For one, the real interde.­
pendence of "spaceship earth," long a part of establishment rhetoric, is 
being recognized as never before in the wake of the oil crisis; and even 
though the lesson has been an expensive one, there is increasing realization 
of the need for an approach to symmetry in international economic relations 
if future breakdowns are to be avoided. In this context greater understanding 
of the differential contribution the MNC can make to development in different 
phases of the growth process can help, both in curbing the excessive appetite 
for quick profits arid the excessive annoyance with red tape on the part of 
corporate managers, and the excessive fear, on the part of the LDCs,of corporate 
1 see P. Goldberg and C. P. Kindleberger, "Toward a GATT for Investment: 
A Proposal for the Supervision of the International Corporation," in Law and 
Policies in International Business, Summer 1970, as well as the Code of Conduct 
referred to in the recent report by UN/ECOSOC on "The Impact of Multinational 
Corporations on the Development Process and, on International Relations" (also 
known as the Report of the Group of Eminent Persons). 
2Op. cit. 
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excesses or big power, nee-colonial machinations. The best basis for 
harnessing the additional resources and talents that are there, it seems 
to us, is full knowledge of what is and what is not in any particular MNC 
btmdle and what is and what is nd: helpful--and at what price--at each stage 
of the development process. We are not at all sure that our attempt to un­
bundle, disaggregate and insert a time dimension has gotten to the heart of 
the matter--there are psychological and political dimensions which are 
cle~rly left to one side--;but we do believe that we have to search in this 
general direction if the global maximization principles of economic inter­
dependence are to be reconcilable with differing distributional claims in 
an· imperfectly competitive real world. 
